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Introduction
In most of the European countries there is almost universal coverage with public health insurance, and more than 50% of health expenditures are …nanced by the general government. Given this institutional background does supplementary private health insurance (PHI) coverage in ‡uence health care utilization? I focus on the utilization of hospital, general practitioner (GP), specialist, and dental care among people aged 50 and over. Due to the age restriction the sample used is not representative for the whole population of the analyzed countries. However, health care utilization increases on average with age, therefore the results can be indicative for the overall health care systems.
Despite the broad coverage with public insurance, the coverage rate with supplementary PHI is still not negligible in the countries analyzed. In this paper I estimate the e¤ect of PHI on health care utilization, and also analyze how these e¤ects vary with some institutional characteristics of the countries.
A seminal empirical paper analyzing the e¤ect of health insurance on the demand for medical care is of Manning et al. (1987) . Based on the RAND health insurance experiment conducted in the U.S., they show that more generous health insurance plans increase the demand for outpatient services. Gibbons and Wilcox-Gok (1998) also …nd positive e¤ect of health insurance coverage on health care utilization probability, using the National Medical Expenditure Survey from the United States. In Europe mandatory health insurance is more widespread, therefore private health insurance might have smaller role in in ‡uencing health care utilization.
Two closely related papers which use European data are of Jones et al. (2006) and Paccagnella et al. (2012) . Jones et al. (2006) decision, and the endogeneity of PHI is taken into account. I identify the e¤ect of PHI by using the assumption that only current employment characteristics in ‡uence the utilization, whereas past employment characteristics in ‡uence PHI coverage.
Section 2 provides an overview of the health care institutions and the role of private health insurance in the analyzed countries. The economic considerations underlying the empirical analysis are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical model, and the dataset used is described in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the empirical results, and Section 7 concludes.
Institutional background
I investigate the e¤ect of supplementary PHI on health care utilization in eleven European countries. There are considerable di¤erences across the health care institutions. Some of these di¤erences are related to health care …nancing and health care resources. The institutional background in ‡uences the role PHI has. The demand for PHI, and its e¤ect on health care utilization depend among others on the out-of-pocket cost of medical services. If the services are covered by the mandatory public insurance then the out-of-pocket costs cannot be further reduced by the supplementary PHI.
In this section I provide some details on the health care systems in the analyzed countries.
I focus on those characteristics which might indicate the role PHI has in …nancing health care.
In Table 1 I present a selection of indicators related to the health care institutions. Except for the data presented in the …rst column, all indicators are based on aggregate statistics provided by the World Health Organization (WHO). 2 In the third column the values are purchasing power parity (ppp) adjusted. I give a detailed explanation in Section 5 how the PHI indicator of the …rst column was generated.
2 The WHO data are based on the WHO European health for all (HFA) database. In the WHO statistics the public health expenditure measure for Switzerland includes the expenditures covered by mandatory private health insurance.
The correlation coe¢ cient of PHI coverage rate with the ratio of health expenditures covered by public sources is close to zero. On the other hand, PHI coverage is more prevalent among people aged 50 or over in those countries where the public health expenditure per inhabitant or relative to GDP is higher. An explanation for these positive relations can be that more developed and widespread health care resources imply higher costs of health care, which can increase not only the public health expenditures, but also the demand for PHI coverage. The following characteristics of the health care systems refer to year 2004, when the survey data I use were collected, and are based on OECD (2004), Paccagnella et al. (2012) , and Thomson et al. (2009) . Except for Switzerland, all the analyzed countries have mandatory public health insurance. In Switzerland there is mandatory insurance, but that is provided by private insurance companies. The coverage with the mandatory insurance is almost universal in all countries except for Germany and Netherlands. In Germany the civil servants, high earners, and self employed are exempt, whereas in the Netherlands the high earners are exempt (prior to 2006).
Although there is almost universal coverage with the mandatory (public) health insurance, some cost sharing arrangements still apply in all countries. These arrangements vary across the countries. It varies to which services and to whom does the cost sharing apply, and also its magnitude di¤ers across the countries. For example, in Austria and Sweden it applies to most services, whereas in Spain there is no cost sharing for GP or specialist care.
In some countries, as in Austria, Belgium, and Italy, those with low income or with chronic health problems are exempt from the cost sharing.
PHI can be the primary health insurance for those not covered by public insurance.
Otherwise, PHI can have supplementary or complementary role. Supplementary PHI covers services not insured by the public insurance. This is the most prevalent role of PHI in Europe.
Complementary PHI can be contracted to cover cost sharing for services not fully …nanced by the public insurance. This is widespread in France, where the complementary PHI is even provided free of charge for those with low income. In the following I call "supplementary private health insurance" all those PHI contracts which do not have primary function.
Economic considerations
In this section I provide some theoretical motivation to the empirical analysis. Health insurance coverage can decrease the observed costs of health services or can make higher quality of services available, both of which increase the demand for medical care.
An important assumption throughout this paper is that PHI coverage is predetermined.
The main reason for this assumption is that individuals above a given age are generally excluded from contracting PHI (see Mossialos and Thomson (2004) ). The decision about buying PHI is likely to be made before age 50, during the earlier working life. This decision can be in ‡uenced by the insurance costs and availability, and by the potential bene…ts of such a contract, which depend on risk-aversion, risk of future health problems and potential health care expenditures. Although PHI is considered as predetermined, some of the in ‡uencing factors of coverage are time-invariant, like gender, education, cohort-e¤ects, or the main features of the health care system, at least in the short to middle run. Thus, it is possible to estimate the e¤ect of such time-invariant factors on the likelihood of PHI coverage.
I assume that individuals maximize a deterministic utility function, which depends on consumption and health. Future health is in ‡uenced by the utilization of health care. Decision about making an initial contact with a physician or going to hospital is made by the individual. I also assume that the frequency of doctoral visits afterwards, and the length of hospital stay are at least partially decided by the patients.
Expenditure on consumption goods and on medical services are limited by income and wealth. The cost of medical services depends on several factors: on the type or quality of the service, whether the individual has PHI, and on the country-speci…c features of health care. In the empirical analysis I control for the country-speci…c e¤ects by including country dummies in the utilization models, and allowing country-speci…c e¤ect of some observables.
Assuming positive but diminishing marginal utility of consumption and health, and positive but diminishing marginal product of medical care on health, the demand for health care services decreases with the realized price and increases with the service quality. 4 Empirical model
Empirical issues of health care demand estimation
Following the model of Grossman (1972) , most empirical health care models include a rich set of regressors to capture health, and health production characteristics. Such empirical models of health care demand are applied among others by Hunt-McCool et al. (1994) and Gibbons and Wilcox-Gok (1998) . This strand of the literature follows the consumer theory approach.
A detailed discussion about the econometric issues of estimating medical care usage models is given by Jones (2000) . Basic issues are that the dependent variable is not continuous, there is a large number of zero observations, which can be modelled with one-step or two-step models, and there are usually measurement problems as well.
Time-invariant but unobserved taste shifters might be correlated both with supplementary PHI coverage and health care utilization. It can be due to adverse selection and to positive selection, as well. First, the problem of adverse selection arises if those people are more likely to be covered with PHI who are also more likely to utilize health care due to 3 Jones et al. (2006) di¤erentiate four in ‡uencing mechanisms of health insurance on utilization: 1. moral hazard e¤ect due to reduced prices, 2. risk reduction e¤ect due to reduced …nancial uncertainty, 3. income transfer e¤ect (ex post transfer from the healthy to the ill), and 4. access e¤ect due to the access to high quality services.
unobserved health problems or due to less subjective disutility attached to medical care. Second, there is positive selection if PHI is more likely to be purchased by wealthier individuals who are at the same time in better health condition, thus have lower demand for health care. Although I control for income and wealth in the empirical models, these controls cannot perfectly capture the economic situation of the respondents.
I estimate the insurance coverage and utilization models on a pooled sample of the analyzed countries. Bago d'Uva and Jones (2009) reject the equality of income and education e¤ects on health care utilization across European countries. However, some assumption of equality is needed in order to avoid the problem of small country-speci…c samples. Apart from including country dummies in the empirical models, I allow the e¤ect of income and wealth on utilization to be country-speci…c. The out-of-pocket costs of health care services vary across countries, these di¤erences imply varying e¤ect of income and wealth on utilization. The liquidity of certain wealth components, thus their e¤ect on health care utilization might also vary across countries. The e¤ect of supplementary PHI on health care utilization is also allowed to be country speci…c.
Two-part speci…cation
In the preferred speci…cation the underlying assumption is that separate processes drive the probability of making any doctoral visits, and the number of visits (similarly for hospital stays). The statistical reason for applying two-stage modelling is the relatively large number of observed zero outcomes. 4 Following the argument of Dow and Norton (2003) , if zero values are "true zeros", i.e. the results of corner solution and not of sample selection then applying sample selection estimation methods can be misleading, whereas two-part models can be appropriate. In addition, Norton et al. (2008) analyze the properties of sample selection and two-part models if there is a large fraction of zero observations and there are no exclusion restrictions. They show that two-part models can be superior even if the errors in the two parts of the models are correlated. In the health care utilization models of this paper there are no clear exclusion restrictions: the same observed characteristics drive the probability of health care utilization and the amount of utilization. This modelling feature calls for the application of two-part models, instead of selection models.
The two-part model is based on the assumption that the second stage error term has zero expected value, conditional on positive outcome and on the exogenous regressors. Based on this assumption the two parts of the model can be estimated separately. The …rst part is about the probability of health care utilization, and the second part is about the amount of utilization. The simple two-part model has to be modi…ed due to the potential endogeneity of PHI in the utilization models.
The equations of the …rst part model the supplementary PHI coverage together with the probability of having any GP visits, specialist visits or hospital stays (P os_Y j ). This part of the model can also be estimated for dental care, for which only a binary indicator of separation between those who utilize and do not utilize health care services. Then the marginal e¤ects are allowed to vary among "latent classes" of the population. I apply the simpler two-part modelling approach, but extend that with handling the endogeneity of PHI coverage. utilization is available.
(1) interactions between health and PHI coverage are not modelled. In this speci…cation I include such control variables that can capture the socioeconomic circumstances when the decision on PHI coverage was made, keeping in mind that this decision was made earlier.
The identifying instruments of supplementary PHI are indicators of the last employment:
the number of people employed at the last job (…rm size), and whether the respondent was public employee, civil servant or self-employed at the last job. The …rm size indicator is based on the number of employees at the current or last job. I di¤erentiate six categories ranging from 1 to 500 plus employees, and an additional category holds if the respondent is self-employed or the question is not applicable (25% of the respondent). Occupational status in ‡uences PHI coverage, as it is possible that the insurance is contracted through or supported by the employer, and in some countries di¤erent insurance regulations hold for the self-employed or civil servants. Paccagnella et al. (2012) document that in most countries covered by SHARE, supplementary PHI coverage is predominant among employees of …rms with more than 24 employees. Mossialos and Thomson (2004) also report that group policies,
i.e. supplementary PHI purchased by groups (typically by employers) have a major role in many European countries. Group policies generally o¤er lower prices and more favorable conditions, and are often provided as an employee bene…t. The availability of group policies varies with …rm size.
The identi…cation is based on the assumption that only the current characteristics of the employment in ‡uence health care utilization decisions, whereas the …rm size at the last employment and the type of the last job in ‡uence insurance coverage. Current job characteristics might in ‡uence health care utilization e.g. through the availability of health services at the workplace or through required regular health checks. I assume that after retirement the characteristics of the last job do not have direct e¤ect on health care utilization, ceteris paribus. Similar identi…cation strategy is applied by Jones et al. (2006) and Paccagnella et al. (2012) . It is important that I control for such factors as income, wealth, and education level in the utilization model, since these in ‡uencing factors of utilization can also be related to having been employed at a large …rm, and to the employment status at the last job.
Assuming that and " 1 have bivariate normal distribution with zero means and unit variances, these two binary models form a bivariate probit model. If the exogeneity assumptions hold (Z and X are exogenous in models (1) and (2)), the bivariate probit model gives consistent estimates.
The nonzero numbers of doctoral visits and hospital nights are estimated by zero-truncated negative binomial regressions. This is the second part of the two-part model. Again, PHI coverage can be endogenous in the utilization models, therefore I apply the method of two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI): …rst I estimate a probit model for the probability of PHI coverage (model (1)), then include the estimated residual as regressor in the zero-truncated negative binomial regression. The 2SRI method is an implementation of the method of instrumental variables in nonlinear models. This approach is widely applied in empirical models in health economics, for a list of citations see Terza et al. (2008) . Provided that there are appropriate instruments for the endogenous regressor, the 2SRI method is consistent.
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Without conditioning on positive utilization, the expected value of the outcome is:
where " 2 includes unobservables (heterogeneity components), exp(" 2 ) has gamma distribution, and E (" 2ji jY ji > 0; X i ; P HI i ;û i ) = 0.û is the …rst stage residual:
where (:) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function, and^ indicates the estimated parameter vector of the probit model. If P HI is exogenous in the jth health care utilization model then j should equal zero. It is assumed in this model that the coe¢ cient of the …rst stage residual is not country speci…c. This follows from the implicit assumption that the correlation between the unobservables in the utilization and PHI coverage models is the same across the countries. Without this assumption separate PHI coverage models should be estimated for all the analyzed countries, and the problem of small country speci…c sample sizes would arise.
The outcome of …nal interest is
The marginal e¤ect of PHI coverage on the expected utilization can be calculated using the estimation results of the two parts of the model. 5 Alternative consistent estimation methods are the full-information maximum likelihood and two-stage method of moments estimation suggested by Terza (1998) .
Based on Terza et al. (2008) , three conditions have to be satis…ed for the consistency of the 2SRI method: 1. The identifying instruments cannot be correlated with the unobservable determinants of health care utilization. 2. The identifying instruments must be correlated with the PHI variable. 3. The identifying instruments might not have direct in ‡uence on the utilization measure, and might not be correlated with the random error term in the utilization model. These conditions are satis…ed based on the assumptions that the characteristics of the last job have no direct e¤ect on current helath care utilization, and these characteristics are independent of the unobservable determinants of utilization.
The empirical analysis is based on the …rst wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), release 2.3.1. 6 The SHARE data covers individuals aged 50+, and their spouses. Since only the …rst wave questionnaire of SHARE contains a question about PHI coverage, I use only the …rst wave, which corresponds to year 2004.
I use samples on 11 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In order to avoid the problem of small samples, I use pooled data, the size of the estimating sample is 23:5 thousand.
I weight the observations so as each country has the same share in the pooled sample. Each weight is country speci…c, and equals the number of all observations divided by the number of observations in the particular country.
Due to the relatively high rate of nonresponse, for income, wealth, and health insurance premia I use the imputed values provided in the dataset. The SHARE dataset contains multiple imputations, I use the average of these. 7 The household-level income and wealth measures are divided by the household size so as to get individual-level measures. I generate the income measure used in this analysis as the gross income minus the health insurance payments. 7 This approach is a simpli…cation, since it neglects the uncertainty of the imputations, therefore can cause downward bias in the estimated standard errors. However, this simpli…cation does not a¤ect the main results of the paper. 8 Since PHI is predetermined in this model, it is reasonable to subtract its costs from the disposable income measure. I replace the net income to one for whom its calculated value is zero or negative (there are 63 such observations in the sample used). The median value of annual payments for private health insurance Some descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table A 9 The chronic conditions are: heart attack, high blood pressure, high blood cholesterol, stroke, diabetes, chronic lung disease, asthma, arthritis, osteoporosis, cancer, stomach ulcer, Parkinson disease, cataracts, hip or fremoral fracture.
The ADL limitations include di¢ culties with dressing, walking across a room, eating, bathing, getting in or out of bed, and using the toilet.
The speci…ed symptoms are: pain in a joint, heart trouble, breathlessness, persistent cough, swollen legs, sleeping problems, falling down, fear of falling down, dizziness, stomach problems, and incontinence. the SHARE about the services the PHI provides, I do not use this information because of the following reasons. First, the de…nitions of these insurance categories vary across the country-speci…c questionnaires. Second, in some insurance categories there are very few observations. The coverage ratios with the basic ten insurance categories are reported in Table A .2 in Appendix A. The predominant type of PHI varies across countries, for example in Austria it is the insurance for hospital care, in the Netherlands the dental care insurance, whereas in Spain the insurance that provides direct access to specialists.
The dependent variables I analyze in this paper refer to the last 12 months before the interview. These are the number of times seeing or talking to general practitioners and to specialists, the number of nights spent in hospital, and reporting visits to dentists. There is no information in the SHARE data about the number of dental visits. However, I can use the information if the respondent had any dental visits or not.
When estimating the number of hospital nights or doctoral visits, I exclude those observations where it is larger than 50. The main reason for this exclusion is theoretical: the underlying utility maximization model might not be valid for those in the worst health condition. Reporting high utilization can indicate critical health condition. Cutting the sample at 50 reported hospital nights, GP or specialist visits excludes less than 1% of the observations. In Table A .3 in Appendix A I present the country-level averages of PHI coverage and health care utilization. There are large di¤erences in supplementary PHI coverage rates (ranging from 5 6% in Greece and Italy to 84% in France).
10 The cross-country variation in the ratio of people reporting specialist visits, dental visits, or hospital stays is also not 10 The di¤erences between the PHI coverage ratios of Table 1 and of Table A .3 in case of Germany and the Netherlands are due to the exclusion of those who are not covered by public health insurance.
negligible, but that is relatively small for GP visits. The majority (85%) of the respondents report some visits to general practitioners.
The SHARE dataset also provides information on the out-of-pocket expenditures on health care. The weighted average of annual out-of-pocket expenditure on inpatient services is 280 EUR for those who report nonzero hospital nights. The average annual outpatient expenditure is 130 EUR among those who report outpatient visits to GPs, specialists or dentist. The survey also asks if the respondent had to forego health care due to high costs: only 4% of the respondents report such di¢ culty, about half of them report that the costs of dental care were not a¤ordable. These statistics indicate that the out-of-pocket inpatient and outpatient health expenditures are moderate in the analyzed European countries. Moral hazard due to PHI coverage is most likely to play a role in dental care utilization. For the other types of health care the role of PHI is more likely to make higher quality services available.
6 Estimation results
Supplementary private health insurance coverage
The estimated coe¢ cients of the probit model of PHI coverage are reported in Appendix B.
Since spouses might make joint decisions on PHI coverage and on health care utilization, I allow the error terms to be correlated across the household members, and the standard errors are clustered by household. Income is estimated to have signi…cantly positive e¤ect on insurance coverage (the reference country is Austria). The Netherlands is an exception in this respect because there the richest individuals are typically covered with primary PHI, which is not included in the supplementary PHI category. Higher education is also associated with higher probability of coverage. Most of the country dummy coe¢ cients are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, due to the di¤erences in the health care and insurance institutions across the countries.
Working for a big …rm at the last employment can indicate the availability of group policies, and accordingly its e¤ect is signi…cantly positive. Although the estimated likelihood of PHI does not increase monotonically, the highest …rm size implies the highest probability of coverage, ceteris paribus. As for the type of the last job, self-employment signi…cantly increases the probability of being covered with PHI.
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These results suggest that the …rm size and employment status indicators might indeed be used for identifying the e¤ect of PHI coverage on health care utilization. When testing the joint signi…cance of these indicators, the p-value of the Wald-test is approximately zero.
Two-part model coe¢ cient estimates
The preferred speci…cation follows the model described in Section 4.2: the utilization is modelled as two-stage decision, and supplementary PHI is considered to be endogenous in both stages.
The …rst part of the model is about the probability of utilization and PHI coverage. This can be estimated for dental care utilization, as well. In Table 2 I present the estimated coe¢ cients of interest based on the bivariate probit models (equations (1) and (2)), and I 11 Based on the estimated marginal e¤ects at the average, the probability of having PHI is 5 percentage points higher if the …rm size is above 500 employees than if the …rm size is between 200 499. The increasing e¤ect of self-employment (compared to private sector employment) at the average is 7 percentage points. also report the estimated coe¢ cient of PHI if insurance coverage is assumed to be exogenous (probit model of equation (2)). If the endogeneity of PHI is neglected then its e¤ect is underestimated in absolute value for hospital, GP and dental care utilization. For specialist care utilization the estimated e¤ects under the simple and bivariate probit models are close to each other. Despite the di¤erences in the point estimates of the probit and bivariate probit speci…cations, the estimated correlation coe¢ cients between the error terms of the PHI and nonzero utilization models (i.e. and " 1 ) are insigni…cant. Thus there is no clear evidence for the endogeneity of PHI in the …rst stage of utilization. 13 The results also indicate that coverage with supplementary PHI increases the probability of utilizing hospital care, visiting specialists and dentists, but decreases the probability of visiting a GP. Most of the estimated coe¢ cients 12 The detailed estimation results can be requested from the author. 13 I also test the di¤erence between the probit and bivariate probit PHI coe¢ cients using the bootstrap Hausman test, following Cameron and Trivedi (2009), p. 429-430 . The test indicates for all four types of health care that the estimated PHI coe¢ cients under the two speci…cations do not di¤er signi…cantly. This implies that the exogeneity of PHI in the …rst stage of utilization cannot be rejected.
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are not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
The estimated coe¢ cients of PHI in the second part of the model are presented in Table   3 . In this part the amount of utilization is analyzed for those respondents who report nonzero hospital nights or doctoral visits, and the method of 2SRI is applied. The standard errors have to be adjusted for two-stage estimation. The results presented in Table 3 are based on bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications. The adjustment of the standard errors has only small e¤ects.
There is some evidence that PHI is endogenous in the second stage decision on GP care utilization. The estimated coe¢ cient of the residual from the probit model of PHI coverage (estimated from equation (3)) is signi…cantly positive in this model. The positive coe¢ cient indicates that the unobservables which increase the probability of PHI coverage also increase the demand for GP care. On the other hand, the residual is insigni…cant in the hospital and specialist care models, thus PHI coverage might be exogenous there.
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The presented results suggest that PHI coverage might increase the probability of hospital care utilization, but decrease the length of the stay. Being covered with PHI implies lower probability and signi…cantly fewer number of visits to GPs. There is some evidence for increased utilization of specialist care due to supplementary PHI coverage, but this e¤ect is small and insigni…cant.
14 The estimation results are consistent if the regressors other than PHI, and the characteristics of the previous job are exogenous. In order to test the validity of the exogeneity assumptions, it is possible to calculate the nonlinear version of the Sargan test, suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2005) , p. 277. The test fails to reject the exogeneity assumptions. 
Analysis of the results
Due to the nonlinear nature of the empirical model, the partial e¤ect of PHI varies among the individuals. In Table 4 I present the estimated marginal e¤ect of supplementary PHI on the number of hospital nights and doctoral visits. Using the estimating sample the mode of the discrete regressors are determined. For the rest of the regressors the mean values are used, and the marginal e¤ect of the insurance indicator is calculated for this representative individual. 15 The estimates of the total e¤ect are based on the combination of the …rst and second part of the model, as described in Section 4.2 (the total e¤ects are presented under the columns "Total"). For each service type I also present the estimated marginal e¤ect on the probability of utilization (columns "Prob.", based on equation (2)), and on the nonzero number of hospital nights or doctoral visits (columns "Nonzero", based on equation (3)).
Except for Denmark and Sweden, PHI coverage has positive marginal e¤ect on the ex- 15 The mfx command of Stata is used when calculating the marginal e¤ects. The signi…cance levels of the marginal e¤ects in the two-part models are based on bootstrapped standard errors. The Stata codes of Deb et al. (2010) are used as basis for the bootstrapping procedures, with 1000 replications. pected number of hospital nights. The estimated increase in the overall number of hospital nights due to PHI coverage is small. The estimated overall positive e¤ects come from the increasing e¤ect of PHI coverage on the probability of utilization. On the other hand, being covered with PHI implies shorter stays in hospitals, and this estimated e¤ect is not negligible in magnitude, although signi…cantly di¤erent from zero only for Spain. Two explanations are possible for these …ndings. First, PHI coverage might make more e¢ cient or alternative (home care) services available. Second, it is also likely that individuals with PHI coverage utilize di¤erent kinds of inpatient services than the uncovered ones. For example, general health checks induced by PHI coverage might necessitate only short stays in hospitals. The estimated marginal e¤ect of supplementary PHI on the expected number of GP visits is negative and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. According to the estimates, PHI has negative e¤ect both on the probability and number of visits to general practitioners, and the secondstage e¤ects are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. The marginal e¤ect on the probability of visiting a GP is of considerable magnitude in some of the countries. For instance, PHI coverage is estimated to decrease the estimated probability for the representative individual by around 30 percentage points in Greece and Italy. The negative e¤ect can be the result of direct access to specialists. Those covered with PHI might also have access to more e¢ cient treatments and preventive care, which again necessitates fewer GP visits, ceteris paribus.
For specialist care utilization the estimated marginal e¤ect of PHI coverage is less than one, insigni…cant, but positive for all countries. The estimated marginal e¤ect on the probability of visiting a specialist is generally positive, but the maximum is 11 percentage points and insigni…cant for all countries. The number of nonzero specialist visits is also estimated to increase due to PHI coverage, but these results are also insigni…cant. This …nding is di¤erent from the results of Jones et al. (2006) , who estimate signi…cantly positive e¤ect of PHI on specialist visits. Although they apply di¤erent methodology to a di¤erent set of European countries, the most likely explanation for the contrasting …ndings lies in the age structure of the estimating sample. The …ndings of Jones et al. (2006) are based on a sample of individuals aged 16 and above, which suggests that specialist care utilization can be more responsive to PHI coverage among the younger generations than among the older ones.
Finally, I also analyze the marginal e¤ect of PHI coverage on the probability of dental care utilization. This e¤ect is positive for all countries. The substantial positive e¤ects in Denmark and the Netherlands are reasonable, since there the main role of supplementary PHI is …nancing dental care.
The estimated marginal e¤ects can be compared to the …ndings of other authors. The …rst stage utilization results are directly comparable to the results reported by Gibbons and Wilcox-Gok (1998) , due to the similar methodology. Based on a U.S. sample they estimate that supplementary PHI coverage in the U.S. increases the probability of outpatient care utilization by about tion results the marginal e¤ect of supplementary PHI coverage on the probability of doctoral care utilization varies across countries and service types. Unanimously positive e¤ect among the outpatient services is found only for dental care. My estimates indicate that PHI has smaller e¤ect on outpatient specialist care utilization in Europe than in the U.S., but the marginal e¤ect on the probability of visits to dentists is relatively large. Similarly to my results, negative e¤ect of PHI coverage on visits to general practitioners is found by Rodríguez and Stoyanova (2004) based on Spanish data. They explain this result by direct access to specialists due to private insurance. Hullegie and Klein (2010) also estimate negative e¤ect of private insurance on doctoral visits in Germany, which they explain by receiving better medical treatment.
How do the estimated e¤ects relate to the country-speci…c characteristics of the public health care system? The estimated marginal e¤ect of supplementary PHI on the probability of hospital stays and dental visits, and on the overall number of hospital nights are positive for most of the countries. These positive e¤ects are larger in countries where the relative measures of public health expenditure are smaller, using the aggregate statistics presented in Table 1 . Thus the role of PHI coverage in making inpatient and dental care available is more important in countries where general government spends relatively less on health care.
The estimated e¤ect of supplementary PHI is also generally positive on the probability and amount of specialist care utilization. There is some evidence for positive correlation of this e¤ect with the indicators of public health expenditures, but these relationships are weak.
The estimated e¤ect of supplementary PHI is negative on the probability and amount of GP care utilization. These negative e¤ects are smaller in absolute value if the public health care is more generous. This result suggests that the role of PHI coverage in ensuring direct access to specialists or higher quality services is less important in countries with larger public health care systems. In countries where public health expenditures are lower there might be greater need for avoiding the gatekeeper function of general practitioners.
Speci…cation checks
In the following, I modify the preferred two-part model, and check how sensitive are the results to changes in the distributional and exogeneity assumptions. In column (1) under each service type in Table 5 I 
(1)
(1) , , signi…cant at the 10, 5, 1% level, respectively, based on bootstrapped ( (1) and (2)) and adjusted (3) standard errors, the adjustment procedure is based on Greene (2003), p. 510. the model is the same as in the two-part model (equations (1) and (2)). I modify equation (3) the following way:
I assume that ; " 1 and" 2 have multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and variance 1; 1; 2 , respectively. The main di¤erence from the speci…cation of the two-part model is that the probability and amount of utilization are estimated jointly, with allowing nonzero correlation between the error terms " 1 and" 2 . The normality assumption simpli…es the manipulation of the likelihood function. I also assume that the correlation coe¢ cients between these error terms are the same across the countries.
TheX vector of regressors is the same as X in models (2) and (3) 16 16 The contribution of the ith observation with nonzero utilization to the likelihood is
(:) is the normal probability density function with mean zero and variance 2 , and l equals 0 or 1. The second term in the last integral can be expressed as a function of" 2ji , using the …rst stage bivariate probit estimation results, and the assumption of multivariate normality. In order to simplify the estimation procedure, I apply The estimated marginal e¤ects are qualitatively di¤erent from the results of the preferred two-part model. The di¤erences can be due to the fact that the selectivity model takes into account that in the second part of the model the sample is not random. However, if the selection model is reestimated with the assumption that the selectivity is exogenous then the results still di¤er from the two-part estimation results. These di¤erences can be due to the di¤erent distributional assumption, and to the exclusion restrictions. Since there are no strong and theoretically funded exclusion restrictions in the selectivity models, the simpler two-part model is preferred. Nevertheless, the results still con…rm the negative partial e¤ect of PHI on the number of visits to general practitioners.
As a …nal speci…cation check, I compare the estimation results of the zero-truncated negative binomial models to the case when PHI coverage is assumed to be exogenous in the second part of the model. Under this speci…cation the residual from the probit model of PHI coverage is not included in the model of nonzero health care utilization. The estimated e¤ects of PHI on hospital nights and GP visits are considerably upward biased, compared to the speci…cation where endogeneity is taken into account (speci…cation (1)). According to these results it is important to take into account the endogeneity of PHI in the utilization models. The sensitivity of the results can be explained by the self-selection into PHI coverage.
Due to the in ‡uencing e¤ect of unobserved preferences, those who are covered with PHI are also more likely to visit general practitioners and to stay longer in hospitals. Therefore speci…cation (4) underestimates the negative e¤ect of PHI coverage on the number of GP two-stage maximum likelihood estimation -I estimate the bivariate probit model of equations (1) and (2) in the …rst stage, and use these estimation results as known in the second stage.
In the simulations I use 100 draws from the Halton sequence with prime number 7. For producing the Halton draws I use the Stata code mdraws written by Cappellari and Jenkins (2006) . Cappellari and Jenkins also discuss the advantages of Halton draws in MSL estimation. visits and hospital nights. In case of outpatient specialist care such upward bias cannot be observed, the association between PHI coverage and the amount of specialist care utilization is still estimated to be weak.
It follows from this analysis that neglecting the correlation between the unobserved terms of the utilization and PHI coverage models a¤ects the estimation results. The speci…cation checks also show that the estimation results are sensitive to the modelling assumptions, in particular to the distributional assumptions, and to the choice between two-part models and selection models. Due to identi…cation problems inherent in the selectivity model, the two-part model is preferred here.
Conclusions
Assuming that individuals behave in utility maximizing way, health insurance coverage should in ‡uence health care utilization decisions. It depends not only on the individual characteristics, but also on the country speci…c institutional backgrounds to what extent supplementary private health insurance coverage in ‡uences the utilization of health care.
In this paper I analyze the e¤ect of supplementary PHI coverage on the utilization of hospital, general practitioner, specialist and dental care among people aged 50 and above in Europe. I model health care utilization as a two-stage decision. Due to the e¤ects of unobservables, insurance coverage is likely to be endogenous in health care utilization models. I identify its e¤ects using the characteristics of the last job. The estimated e¤ects are compared across various modelling assumptions. The size, and in some cases also the sign of the estimated e¤ects vary with the assumptions. The speci…cation tests show that the exogeneity assumptions about supplementary PHI have substantial e¤ect on the estimated coe¢ cients.
I compare the e¤ects of supplementary PHI among 11 European countries. According to the results of the preferred two-part speci…cation, PHI coverage increases hospital, outpatient specialist and dental care utilization, but has a negative e¤ect on visits to general practitioners. The e¤ects on the expected number of hospital nights and visits to specialists are insigni…cant and close to zero. Both the positive e¤ects on hospital and dental care utilization, and the negative e¤ects on general practitioner care utilization are larger in absolute value in countries where public health care funding is less generous.
The empirical results indicate that although there is almost universal coverage with public health insurance in the analyzed European countries, the role of supplementary private health insurance is not negligible among individuals aged 50 and over. There is evidence that the main roles of private insurance are making dental services available, and avoiding the otherwise compulsory visits to general practitioners when making contacts with specialists.
The results presented in the paper can be informative for health policy decisions. Supporting private health insurance coverage might increase the utilization of some types of health services, especially of dental care, and direct the demand towards more e¢ cient service types.
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